States in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. We extend the methodology in Olivetti and Paserman (2013) to explore four different channels of intergenerational mobility: between fathers sons and grandsons; fathers, sons and granddaughters; fathers, daughters and grandsons; and fathers, daughters, and granddaughters.
Introduction
The dramatic increase in income inequality over the past four decades has led to a renewed interest in how economic status is transmitted across generations. A high degree of inequality that persists across generation undermines the very notion of equality of opportunity.
The availability of large administrative datasets has pushed the envelope of research on intergenerational mobility, allowing scholars to explore in much more detail the nature of the transmission mechanism across generations (see for example Chetty et al., 2014a and 2014b) .
One of the most interesting recent developments is the study of the transmission of economic status across multiple generations (Solon 2013 , Mare 2011 . This extends a large literature (see Solon, 1999 and Black and Devereux, 2011 for extensive surveys) that examined intergenerational mobility across two generations, typically focusing on fathers and sons. However, the transmission mechanism may be substantially more complex. For example, grandparents may make independent human capital investments in grandchildren or affect parental incentives to invest. Grandchildren might also benefit from tapping into the financial resources and social connections of their grandparents. The biological process underlying the transmission of traits is similarly complex, spanning multiple generations. Moreover, both institutions and biology can potentially lead to a differential effect of paternal and maternal grandparents. For example, in a patrilineal society wealth would be transmitted mostly through the paternal line. Alternatively, the resources of maternal grandparents may either facilitate the ability of mothers to invest in their children or amplify the effects of a given amount of investment.
A handful of studies have tackled the measurement of multigenerational effects on income transmission using historical data. Ferrie and Long (2015) measure occupational mobility across three generations by tracing men through federal censuses from 1850 to 1910 in the UK and the US. Clark (2014) examines intergenerational mobility over the very long term by tracing the performance of men with particular surname characteristics over time. These studies find evidence of significant multigenerational effects. However, both studies use surnames in some capacity to trace families over time; as such they are limited in their ability to assess the importance of maternal grandparents or characterizing intergenerational mobility for granddaughters, as they cannot be linked to their grandchildren by surname. An exception is the work by Lindahl et al. (2015) who estimate the persistence of human capital over four generations of individuals linking data from Malmö's parish registries in the 1930s to the modern census records.
In this paper, we estimate intergenerational elasticities across three generations for the United States during the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, extending the methodology originally developed by Olivetti and Paserman (2015) . Our unique contribution is the analysis of the effects of both maternal and paternal grandparents on both granddaughters and grandsons.
The key insight of our methodological approach is that the information about socioeconomic status conveyed by first names can be used to create pseudo-links between grandfathers (G1), fathers (G2) and children (G3). Specifically, the empirical strategy amounts to imputing father's income, which is unobserved, using the average income of fathers of children with a given first name. Extending this idea, one can also impute grandfather's income as a weighted average of the name-specific average income of the fathers' fathers, with weights equal to the fraction of fathers with that name among all the fathers of G3 children with a given first name. 1 The intuition for why this methodology works can be explained using a simple example.
Assume that the only possible names for boys in generation G3 are Adam and Zachary, with high socioeconomic status G2 parents more likely to name their child Adam, and Zachary being more common among low socioeconomic status parents. In a society with a high degree of intergenerational mobility, we would not expect the adult Adams to have much of an advantage on the adult Zacharys. Moreover, in the previous generation (G1) the fathers of men who name their sons Adam should be almost indistinguishable from the fathers of men who name their sons Zachary. On the other end in a more rigid society the adult Adams grow to be richer than the adult Zacharys, and the G1 fathers of men who name theirs sons Adam are expected to be richer. Therefore, one can obtain a good measure of intergenerational mobility by correlating the average incomes of people with a given name, that of fathers of people with that name, and that of fathers of fathers who assign that name.
A distinct advantage of our approach is that it allows us to measure the importance of maternal grandparents as well as paternal grandparents. Our methodology applies equally well to women: just replace Adam and Zachary in the previous example with Abigail and Zoë, and use husband's income as the measure of women's socioeconomic status. Olivetti and Paserman (2015) use this methodology to provide the first estimate of intergenerational mobility between fathers and daughters in the late 19 th and early 20 th Centuries. In the case of three generations, the methodology allows us to estimate four different channels of intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status: fathers-sons-grandsons, fathers-sonsgranddaughters, fathers-daughters-grandsons and fathers-daughters-granddaughters. Moreover, we are able to model intergenerational income transmission by including the income of both paternal and maternal grandparents in the same regression. It is important to emphasize at this point that even though our methodology does not necessarily recover the intergenerational elasticity estimates that would be obtained with a true intergenerationally linked data set, it is still able to provide comparable estimates of the evolution of long-run mobility across all the possible gender lines. Thus, our analysis is able to explicitly test the relative importance of paternal and maternal grandparents, which affords it the potential to uncover different mechanisms through which gender differentials in intergenerational mobility may arise.
Using 1% extracts from the Decennial Censuses of the United States between 1850 and 1940, we find evidence that, even after controlling for the income in generation G2 ("father's income"), the income of generation G1 ("grandfather's income") has a large and positive effect on the income of generation G3 ("grandchild's income"). 2 Our findings suggest that traditional estimates of intergenerational mobility that assume a first-order autoregressive process for income may substantially understate the true extent of intergenerational persistence in economic status, in accordance to other recent papers that link multiple generations (e.g., Ferrie and Long, 2015; Lindahl et al., 2015) . 3 In addition, we find interesting gender differentials in the strength of the correlation between the three generations. Our results indicate that the transmission of economic status is passed along mostly through gendered lines. That is, paternal grandfathers matter more than maternal grandfathers for the income of grandsons, while the opposite is true for granddaughters. Furthermore, holding the gender of the second generation constant, we find that 2 Solon (2013) argues that even if grandparents do not have a direct effect on children's outcomes, the inclusion of multigenerational effects may serve to rectify attenuation bias stemming from the mis-measurement of single generation effects. 3 Our estimate imply that a given income shock would take two more generations to fade out relative to what would be predicted by an AR(1) process. maternal grandfathers are more important for granddaughters than for grandsons, while the opposite is true for paternal grandfathers.
We propose two alternative theoretical frameworks that can rationalize these findings.
The first is a three generation dynastic model in which there is tension between G1's and G2's preferences over G2's and G3's consumption. This framework can rationalize our findings if the timing of intergenerational transfers is gender specific; for example, if parents assign dowries to their daughters (when they are still alive) and leave bequests to their sons (upon their death). The second is an intergenerational mobility model in which individuals' desirability in the marriage market is a function of 'market' and 'non-market' traits. This framework can rationalize our findings based on gender asymmetries in the relative importance of market and non-market traits, as well as differences in the degree of inheritability across traits and, potentially, across genders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the methodology as well as the data used for the analysis and some measurement issues. The main results and some robustness checks are presented in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 presents the theoretical frameworks that we use to provide a possible interpretation for our findings.
Methodology and Data
Consider an individual i belonging to G3 who is young at time t − s and adult at time t (in practice, we will look at generations separated by 20 or 30 years). Let y it be individual i's log earnings at time t, y it−s be his father's (G2) log earnings at time t − s, and y it−2s be his father's father's log-earnings (G1) at t−2s. With individually linked data, y it , y it−s and y it−2s are all observed, and the intergenerational elasticity estimate is obtained by regressing y it on y it−s and y it−2s .
Assume instead that we only observe three separate cross-sections and it is impossible to link individuals across the three. This means that both y it−s and y it−2s are unobserved, and it becomes necessary to impute them. Our strategy is to base the imputation on an individual's first name, which is available for both adults and children in each cross-section.
Linking generation G2 to generation G3
To link individuals from generations G2 and G3, we follow the same approach used in Olivetti and Paserman (2015) . For a G3 adult at time t named j, we replace y it−s withỹ jt−s , the average log earnings of G2 fathers of children named j, obtained from the time t−s cross section (the "prime" indicates that this average is calculated using a different sample). We have thus created a "generated regressor" by using one sample to create a proxy for an unobserved regressor in a second sample. The income elasticity across generations G2 and G3 can then be estimated by a regression of y it onỹ jt−s . The regression is run at the individual G3 level, with every G3 adult named j having the same imputed value of his father's income. Olivetti and Paserman (2015) show that if names carry information about economic status, this estimator will be informative of the underlying parameters governing the process of intergenerational mobility. 4 We restrict the sample of G2 fathers to be in the same age range as the sample of G3 adults; this is to facilitate our links to G1, which will be explained in the following subsection.
Linking generation G1 to generation G2
Adding a link to generation G1 is slightly more complicated. We would like to impute G1's income to a G3 adult named j as the average income of the grandfathers of children named j in year t − 2s. However, two difficulties arise: first, G3 adults in year t would not have been born in year t − 2s, so it is impossible to make a "direct" pseudo-link to year t − 2s. Second, making "direct" pseudo-links from G1 to G3 would require households to be multigenerational, i.e. containing children and grandfathers residing together, which was not typically the case.
However, we can still apply the same principle used for the G2-G3 link, extended to an additional generation. For example, suppose that children named Adam in year t − 20 have fathers named David, Edward and Fred, in equal proportions. The income assigned to G1 for the group of G3 adults named "Adam" is the weighted average, with weights 1 3 , 1 3 , 1 3 , of the average income at time t − 40 of all fathers of children named David, Edward and Fred, respectively.
Formally, we proceed as follows. First, we calculate q j,k as the fraction of fathers (G2) named k of children (G3) named j. This value is taken from Census year t − s, in which G2 individuals are adults, and G3 children still live at home with their parents. Second, we calculateỹ k,t−2s , the average log earnings of G1 fathers of children named k (this average is calculated from Census year t−2s and we use the "double-prime" to indicate that this average is calculated using yet a different sample). Finally, we calculateỹ j,t−2s as:
In other words, the average log earnings of the grandfathers of G3 adults named j are a weighted average of the name-specific average log earnings of the fathers of G2 fathers, with the weights equal to the fraction of G2 individuals with that name among all the fathers of G3 children named j.
One can then obtain an estimate of the income elasticity across the three generations by running a regression of y i,t onỹ j,t−s andỹ j,t−2s . Again, this regression is run at the individual G3 level, with all G3 adults with the same first name having identical imputed incomes of G2 and G1.
The description above was presented in terms of the father-son-grandson relationship. It is easy to see, however, that the methodology can be applied to fathers-son-granddaughters, fathers-daughters-grandsons, and fathers-daughters-granddaughters. Therefore, we will be able to analyze gender differentials in the transmission of economic status across multiple generations.
Data and Measurement Issues
We use data from the 1850 to 1940 Decennial Censuses of the United States, which contain a wealth of information, including first names. For 1850 to 1930 we use the 1% IPUMS samples (Ruggles et al., 2010) . For 1940 we create a 1% extract of the IPUMS Restricted Complete Count Data (Minnesota Population Center and Ancestry.com, 2013). We restrict all the analysis to whites to avoid issues associated with the almost complete absence of blacks in the pre-Civil War period, and the fact that even in the late cohorts many blacks would have spent a substantial part of their lives as slaves.
Individual level data are available from IPUMS for every decadal Census from 1850 to 1940, with the exception of 1890. This means that we can calculate our three-generation measures of intergenerational mobility for three triplets observed at a distance of 20 years from one another (1860-1880-1900, 1880-1900-1920, and 1900-1920-1940) ; and for three triplets of observations observed at a distance of 30 years from one another (1850-1880-1910, 1870-1900-1930, and 1880-1910-1940) . This gives us a unique long-run perspective on the transmission of economic status across generations.
A challenge that applies to all computations of historical intergenerational elasticities is to obtain appropriate quantitative measures of socioeconomic status. Because income and earnings at the individual level are not available before the 1940 Census, we are constrained to use measures of socioeconomic status that are based on individuals' occupational status.
While this contrasts with the current practice among economists, who prefer to use direct measures of income or earnings if available, there is a long tradition in sociology to focus on occupational categories (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992) . One of the advantages of the IPUMS data set is that it contains a harmonized classification of occupations, and several measures of occupational status that are comparable across years. For our benchmark analysis, we choose the OCCSCORE measure of occupational standing. This variable indicates the median total income (in hundreds of dollars) of persons in each occupation in 1950.
A second challenge arises from our methodology for measuring generation G1 occupational income. As explained above, the income of fathers of generation G2 is computed as a weighted mean of mean incomes by first names. This implies that the distribution of income for G1 is substantially more compressed than that of G2 and G3. This is is apparent from the standard deviation of the average log occupational income of each of the three generations (calculated at the G3 name level). In our sample of G2 and G3 males in 1860-1880-1900, this value is 0.314 for G3, 0.298 for G2, and only 0.091 for G1. As we show below, this inflates the OLS estimate of the G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity relative to the G2-G3 elasticity. Therefore, in most of our analysis we transform the right hand side variables from log occupational scores to percentile ranks (of the mean income by first name) as a way to get around this problem.
Results

Basic Results
In this section, we assess our methodology and compare our intergenerational income elasticities across three generations to those obtained using the IPUMS Linked Representative Samples. Because of this comparison we restrict our analysis to males and focus on two data points, 1860-1880-1900 and 1850-1880-1910, for which linked data across two cohorts are publicly available.
We first show how our results are affected by the choice of the right-hand side variable, i.e., whether we use the average log income of generations G2 and G3 in levels, or its percentile rank. Table 1 presents the intergeneration elasticity estimates when the independent variable is the log occupational income score in levels. The first column shows that the intergenerational elasticity between the 1860 and 1880 cohorts is about 0.29, which is similar in magnitude to the estimate obtained in Olivetti and Paserman (2013), albeit slightly smaller. 5 Column 2 regresses the log occupational scores of G3 males on those of their grandfathers (G1). At approximately 0.6, the coefficient is implausibly large given the size of the estimated G2-G3 intergenerational elasticity. This demonstrates the issue identified earlier: because of the way the variables are constructed, the distribution of G1 earnings is compressed relative to that of G2, which will tend to inflate the coefficient on G1 earnings. Column 3 includes the income of both G1 and G2 males on the right hand side. Both coefficients are statistically significant and quite similar in magnitude. However, we are concerned that this effect may be overstated, given the compression of our measure of G1 income and its apparent effect on the results in column (2) .
Panel A of
To overcome this problem, we re-estimate the regressions, but we transform the earnings variables for G1 and G2 from logs to percentile ranks. This should alleviate the problem of excessive compression of the distribution of G1 earnings. The results are presented in panel B of table 1. Column 1 shows the one-generation (G2-G3) estimate of intergenerational mobility.
The coefficient in column 1 indicates that going from the bottom to the top percentile of earnings in generation G2 is associated with an increase in log occupational income of about 0.26. Column 2 links G3 to G1, and Column 3 adds the link to G1. As anticipated, the size of the coefficient on G1's earnings rank is substantially reduced. Still, we find that G1's earnings rank has a significant positive effect on the log earnings of G3, even after controlling for the earnings rank of G2. The statistically significant coefficient on G1 income implies that the intergenerational income transmission process is better characterized as an AR(2), and ignoring the second order autoregressive term will lead to overstating the extent of long- Next we use the IPUMS Linked Representative Samples to test our methodology. These data contain true links between fathers and sons, which allow us to compare results obtained from our pseudo panels to results obtained using actual father-son pairs. Using the sample that links individuals from the 1880 to 1900 censuses, we define G3 income as the income of the adult in 1900, and G2 income as the income of this person's father in 1880; this is a true link. To obtain G1 income, we create a pseudo link: because we observe the name of the individual's father in 1880, we can calculate the average income of fathers of boys with this name in 1860. This allows us to create a panel in which all links are "direct," so we do not face issues related to the compression of the earnings distribution of certain generations relative to others. Table 1 are similar to the coefficients on G1 in both panels of Table 2 . This suggests that our percentile rank regressions offer a more accurate picture of the true G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity. We will continue to use this method for the duration of the paper.
These results are not strictly comparable, as the regressors in the first three columns are percentile ranks, while the regressors in the final three columns are log occupational scores.
However, the results can be compared in the following way. In column (2), a one standard deviation increase in the percentile rank of G1 (0.171) leads to an increase of 0.026 in the log occupational income of G3. Similarly, in column (5), a one standard deviation increase in the log occupational income of G1 (0.139) is associated with an increase of 0.033 in the log occupational income of G3. Table 3 presents regressions of G3 earnings on the percentile rank of earnings of G1 and G2, using all possible gender combinations and both decade triplets in which the distance between generations is 20 years (1860-1880-1900; 1880-1900-1920; 1900-1920-1940 Notice that the coefficient on G1 is positive and significant in almost all cases. This offers further support for the existence of multigenerational effects. There also appears to be a slight upward time trend: in all but one gender pairing (G2 male and G3 female), the coefficient on G1 increases over time. As in Olivetti and Paserman (2013), we find that the G2 coefficient increases between 1900 and 1920, then levels off by 1940: one-generation mobility in the US declines between the late part of the 19 th and the early part of the 20 th Century. The G1-G3 elasticity estimates also exhibits a leveling off between 1920 and 1940. This table already illustrates interesting differences in the G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity by gender. First, consider how the G1-G3 coefficient is affected by the gender of G2.
Gender Differentials
For G3 males, the G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity is always greater when G2 is male. To see this, compare columns (1) and (2), (3) and (4) and (5) and (6) in the top panel. This suggests that grandsons are more heavily influenced by paternal grandfathers than maternal grandfathers. For G3 females, on the other hand, the pattern is more mixed. This can be seen in the bottom panel of the table. In columns (3)-(4) and (5)-(6), the G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity is greater when G2 is female, but the sign is reversed in columns (1)- (2) .
The intergenerational elasticity also appears to be affected by the gender of G3. When G2 is female, the G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity tends to be greater for G3 females, as is apparent, in columns (2) and (4) but not in (6) , from the comparison of the coefficients in the first row of Panel A and B. This means that maternal grandfathers tend to have a greater influence on their granddaughters than their grandsons. Similarly, a comparison of Panel A and B suggests that paternal grandfathers tend to have a greater influence on their grandsons than granddaughters, this is observed in column (3) and (5) but not in column (1) . Table 4 repeats the analysis in Table 3 using decade triplets separated by 30-year intervals (1850-1880-1910; 1870-1900-1930; 1880-1910-1940) . These coefficients do not systematically differ in magnitude from those in Table 3 . This table exhibits a broadly similar time trend to Table 3 , most notably in the coefficient on G2.
The gender differences seen in Table 3 are borne out in Table 4 : grandsons inherit more from paternal than maternal grandfathers (compare columns (1) and (2), (3) and (4), (5) and (6) in panel A), and maternal grandfathers pass on more to granddaughters than grandsons (see panel B). Comparing the G1 coefficients in panel A and B by column, we observe that paternal grandfathers tend to have a greater influence on their grandsons than granddaughters, while the opposite holds true for maternal grandfathers. We explore these gender differences further in the subsequent sections.
One initial concern is that comparisons by gender may be sensitive to the way our samples are constructed. For example, we measure a woman's socioeconomic status by the earnings of her husband. This means that all women in our sample are married, whereas men need not be married to be included. Then, we may be measuring differences in intergenerational income transmission by marital status rather than gender. Furthermore, we do not place restrictions on the age of these husbands in our baseline specification; therefore, our results may reflect the fact that we are measuring income at different points in the life cycle for women and men.
To ensure that our results are not being driven by these details of our sample construction, we redo the analysis imposing different restrictions on G2 and G3. The additional restriction we impose on G2 is that individuals in the sample be married to a spouse in the same age range as the individual (20-35 or 30-45, depending on the sample years). We impose two additional restrictions on G3. First, we restrict individuals to be married; second, we restrict individuals to be married to a spouse in his or her age range. We calculate the G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity for each of 6 combinations of these sample restrictions (including the baseline sample restrictions). The results, using the 1860-1880-1900 sample, are reported in Appendix Table   1 . Altogether, it appears that these different sample restrictions have only a minimal effect on the baseline results.
To summarize the results of the above robustness analysis, we compile all G1-G3 intergenerational elasticities estimated under different sample restrictions in each decade triplet.
There are 144 such estimates. 7 We regress these on indicators for chronological order (earliest, middle, or latest sample), the interval that separates generations (20 or 30 years), the gender of G2, the gender of G3, and categorical variables indicating which sample restrictions are imposed. Standard errors are clustered at the specification level. We report these results in Table   5 . In column (1) we pool all specifications, and in the remaining columns we separate them by gender. Column (2) contains only G3 males, and column (3) contains only G3 females; similarly, column (4) contains only G2 males, and column (5) contains only G2 females.
This exercise supports the existence of an upward time trend in the G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity, and it suggests that this elasticity declines as the interval at which cohorts are constructed increases. While there is no overall tendency for the coefficient to be higher when G2 is male, the picture changes dramatically when we segregate G3 by gender. For G3 males, the effect is clearly stronger when G2 is male. For G3 females, the opposite is true.
Again, there is no significant difference in the G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity by gender of G3 overall, but this masks significant differences when we separate by gender of G2. When G2 is male, the effect is much stronger for G3 males. When G2 is female, the effect tends to be stronger for G3 females, although this is not quite statistically significant.
Gender Differentials: Extension of Methodology
Our methodology allows us to go a step further in illustrating the gender differences in the G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity. Specifically, we are able to regress G3 earnings on the earnings of maternal and paternal grandfathers together. To see how this can be accomplished, consider the following example. Suppose there is one G3 child named Adam in 1880, and his parents (both between the ages of 20 and 35) are named Bill and Barbara. The (G2) earnings of both Bill and Barbara will be defined as Bill's earnings, as we are defining a woman's earnings as those of her husband. Paternal G1 earnings will be the average earnings of fathers of children named Bill in 1860; similarly, maternal G1 earnings will be the average earnings of fathers of children named Barbara in 1860. These values can both be included in a regression of Adam's (G3) earnings in 1900 on the earnings of G2 and G1. This approach has two advantages: first, it allows us to estimate the effect of one grandparent's income, holding the income of the other grandparent constant; second, we can directly test whether or not paternal grandparents have a greater effect on grandchildren's earnings than maternal grandparents, which is what our results so far suggest.
These results are presented in Table 6 . Rather than estimating G1-G3 elasticities for each pseudo-panel separately, we pool all three panels constructed at 20 or 30 year intervals and include decade controls in our regressions. This allows us to neatly characterize gender differences in the transmission of socioeconomic status over the entire sample period. The regressions are run separately for G3 males and females, and the coefficients are reported side by side. The third to last row contains the p-value from a test of the equality of the coefficients on paternal and maternal G1. For G3 males, the coefficient on paternal G1 is quite significantly higher than the coefficient on maternal G1 in both the panels constructed at 20 and 30 year intervals. For G3 females, the coefficient on maternal G1 is larger than the coefficient on paternal G1 in both cases, but it is only significant at the 10% level when the panels are constructed at 30 year intervals.
Looking across equations, we see that the coefficient on paternal G1 tends to be higher for G3 males than for G3 females, and this is statistically significant in both cases. The opposite is true of the coefficient on maternal G1: this is higher for G3 females, and this difference is always significant. 8 These results are consistent with our other findings on gender differences in the transmission of income across three generations. We discuss alternative economic mechanisms that can rationalize these gendered patterns of intergenerational transmission in Section 4.
Having reported our basic set of results, we test the sensitivity of these results to our method of measuring earnings. Our findings make use of a ranking of occupations based on the 1950 occupational wage distribution. If this wage distribution in 1950 differs from the wage distribution during the periods we focus on, this may affect our results. Most importantly, our results are likely to be sensitive to the placement of farmers in the occupational wage distribution, as farmers comprise a very large fraction of the occupations in our sample. To test the sensitivity of our results to the occupational ranking, we use an occupational income distribution from 1900, and we impute a wage for farmers using data from the 1900 Census To further test that our results are not sensitive to our occupational wage measure, we construct a measure based on personal property reported in 1860 and 1870. This is advantageous because it corresponds to the earlier periods in our analysis. We calculate mean personal property of household heads by occupation, pooling data from 1860 and 1870 and adjusting for price differences between these two decades. One issue is that farmers' personal property consists largely of equipment or resources used in farming; as such, it does not make sense to think about this property as a measure of labor income. In fact, including this property will likely overstate the status of farmers considerably. We adjust farmers' personal property downward by the average value of farm equipment and livestock in 1860 and 1870, using national average values from the census of agriculture (Haines and ICPSR 2010). 10 We report results using the 1900 wage distribution and the 1860-1870 occupational wealth distribution in Table 7 . We estimate the coefficient on maternal and paternal grandparents simultaneously, as we did in Table 6 , pooling all three panels constructed at 20 or 30 years intervals. When we use the 1900 wage distribution, the magnitude of the G1-G3 elasticity is quite comparable to that obtained using the 1950 occupational wage distribution. The gender differences in the G1-G3 elasticity also remain, although these differences are not always significant at conventional levels. When we use the 1860-1870 wealth distribution, the coefficients are typically larger. However, the gender differences in the G1-G3 elasticities broadly remain, although these differences are not always significant. We also tested the sensitivity of our findings to including controls for age, immigrant status, and literacy (results not reported). These controls have a minimal effect on the coefficients on G1 earnings, and they do not alter the underlying patterns we find.
Altogether, we conclude that status is transmitted across three generations in a way that depends on gender. While our results are somewhat sensitive to the exact measurement of income, we will show in a subsequent section that our baseline results mask heterogeneity in the G1-G3 transmission process across regions, and that these regional differences in the role of gender are highly robust. We will discuss these regional differences after offering a theoretical framework for interpreting gender differences in the G1-G3 elasticity.
Interpretation
The empirical analysis in the previous sections has uncovered a number of interesting stylized facts on the intergenerational correlations between grandchildren and their paternal and maternal grandfathers. We use the notation ρ g,P AT and ρ g,M AT to denote correlations between grandchildren of gender g with their paternal and maternal grandfathers, respectively. The results of the previous sections can be summarized as follows:
1. The correlation of male grandsons with their paternal grandfathers is stronger than the correlation with their maternal grandfathers (ρ M,P AT > ρ M,M AT ; Table 7 , column 2).
The correlation between female granddaughters with their maternal grandfathers is
stronger than that with their paternal grandfathers (ρ F,M AT > ρ F,P AT ; Table 7 , column 3).
3. The correlation between paternal grandfathers and grandsons is stronger than the correlation between paternal grandfathers and granddaughters (ρ M,P AT > ρ F,P AT ); Table   7 , column 4). 4 . The correlation between maternal grandfathers and granddaughters is stronger than the correlation between maternal grandfathers and grandsons (ρ F,M AT > ρ M,M AT ; Table 7 , column 5).
We now discuss mechanisms that can rationalize these findings.
Gender Differences: Possible Mechanisms
There are a number of reasons to expect paternal and maternal grandparents to impact their grandchildren in different ways. In this section, we provide a brief overview of some of these reasons. What is more difficult to explain is the gender asymmetry in the relative importance of paternal and maternal grandparents that have documented above. In the next section, we will propose a formal model that can account for these differences.
Certain features of the marriage market during this period suggest that paternal grandfathers may have had a greater impact on their grandchildren than maternal grandfathers.
Residential patterns of married couples suggest that paternal grandfathers had a greater direct influence on their grandchildren than maternal grandfathers. Even when intergenerational transfers of wealth or human capital flow from G1 to G2 to G3 (instead of from G1 to G3 directly), paternal grandfathers may have exerted greater control over these transfers than maternal grandfathers. This matters if individuals from G1 and G2 have systematically different preferences over the consumption of G3, a conjecture that is consistent with a model of intergenerational transmission with quasi-hyperbolic, or β − δ preferences over the consumption of future generations. 11 If each generation heavily discounts the utility of future generations relative to its own utility, but the discount factor between any two future generations is relatively low, this creates a tension between G1's and G2's desired allocation of consumption across three generations. Namely, G1 will prefer to allocate more to G3 (and less to G2) than G2 will. So, the G1-G3 elasticity should be greater when G1 is better able to enforce his preferred allocation across the three generations. 12 Because of marriage institutions (and specifically the allocation of property rights within 11 Quasi-hyperbolic preferences have been made popular in recent years to model the intra-personal selfcontrol problems in consumption and savings decisions and other contexts (Laibson, 1997 ; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005). However, one of the first applications of β − δ preferences (Phelps and Pollak, 1968 ) was to an intergenerational growth model that would be applicable here. 12 We present this argument formally in the appendix.
the marriage), postmarital location norms, and the differential timing of transfers to sons and daughters, it is likely that paternal grandfathers were better able to exert control over transfers to their grandchildren than maternal grandfathers.
First, we note that the United States in the 19 th Century was very much a virilocal society,
where married daughters leave their parental nest, while married sons do not. A quick examination of the 1880 and 1900 IPUMS samples reveals a tendency for young married couples to reside with husbands' rather than wives' parents. During the period of focus of this study, only 10-12 percent of married couples under 35 resided in the same household as a parent;
however, that parent was significantly more likely to belong to the husband. This is especially true of agricultural families: young couples residing with a parent were twice as likely to be living with the husband's parents rather than with the wife's parents. This may also mask a tendency for families to reside in the same locality as the husband's parents, even if they do not reside in the same household. Families' residential locations by themselves were likely to affect the degree of control of the first generation over the allocation of resources by the second generation. Paternal grandparents were likely better able to monitor the decisions of their sons who lived in close vicinity, and may have been able to transfer resources directly to their grandchildren.
The residential location of married children may also affect the timing of transfers from parents. For example, Botticini and Siow (2003) argue that in virilocal societies, altruistic parents will leave dowries to their daughters and bequests to their sons to mitigate a free-rider problem. Other papers focus on the role of marital arrangements, with males remaining close to their parents' households and specializing in farm production and women moving to new households, for consumption smoothing and agency problems (see for example, Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989 , based on data on rural India; and Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2005a and 2005b, on rural Ethiopia). 13 Even though formal dowries were relatively uncommon in North America in the 19 th Century, 14 it is possible that, because of these living arrangements, transfers from parents to daughters were more likely to occur at marriage than were transfers from parents 13 We investigate the insurance motive by running a regression that includes an interaction term between parent and grandparents income. We did not find any evidence that grandparents have a larger effect if parents are poorer, independent of G3 gender. 14 Botticini and Siow (2003) document that in late 18 th Century Connecticut, between 46 and 67 percent of married daughters were assigned inter vivos transfers from their family of origin, likely at the time of their marriage. However, by 1820's, only 40 percent received such transfers.
to sons.
The timing of intergenerational transfers for daughters, coupled with the legal environment in place during the period of analysis, may affect the ability of the second generation to decide on the allocation of consumption between itself and the third generation. Assume that, as discussed above, G2 daughters receive transfers from their parents upon marriage. In the 19 th Century, women completely relinquished control of their assets to their husbands. Under the doctrine of coverture, a husband owned any wages earned by his wife and any property she brought to the marriage (Geddes and Lueck, 2002). States began to lift some of these restrictions in the second half of the Century, but it was not until 1920 that coverture had effectively disappeared.
Therefore, it seems reasonable that, in the presence of a daughter, the G1 patriarch would have had little say over the allocation of resources between G2 and G3. On the other hand, G2 sons were more likely to receive a bequest, only upon G1's death. The fact that G1 could withhold the transfer of resources to his male offspring implies that it was also easier for G1 to monitor the allocation of resources between G2 and G3, and therefore guarantee that the investment in the grandchild's human capital would be sufficiently high.
On the other hand, there are certain factors that tend to make maternal grandfathers more important than paternal grandfathers. First, daughters are likely to have children earlier than sons. Thus, their children are more likely to have known their grandfathers, who might have directly invested in their daughter's children. In addition, the direct G2-G3 income transfer may be measured with more error when G2 is female. This is because married women during this period rarely worked, so it is necessary to measure a married woman's economic status by her husband's income, which is an indirect measure. As such, when we include G1 income in our regressions, this is likely to correct more error in the income measurement of female G2 than male G2. This should tend to increase the apparent contribution of maternal grandparents relative to paternal grandparents.
Multi-trait Matching and Inheritance
The predictions of the previous model are the same for both grandsons and granddaughters and suggest that paternal grandfathers should always matter more than maternal grandfathers.
By contrast, the empirical evidence points to a larger effect of the paternal grandfather only for grandsons, while in fact for granddaughters it appears that the maternal grandfather matters more. In the following, we present an alternative model that can rationalize the pattern of relative importance of maternal and paternal grandfathers by grandchild's gender observed in the data. We adapt the model of intergenerational mobility and multi-trait matching in Chen et al. (2013) to allow for multiple generations. Based on this model, the observed gender differences in social mobility can be rationalized based on asymmetries between market and non-market traits which we discuss below. 15 The basic premise of the model is that individuals' attractiveness in the marriage market is a function of both 'market' and 'non-market' traits. Market traits (which we denote by y) directly affect an individual's earning potential. They can include elements such as cognitive skills or education. Non-market traits (denoted by x) do not directly affect earnings potential. They can include physical attractiveness, health, kindness and other attributes signaling reproductive capacity -all things that potentially have little impact on market productivity but are valued in the marriage market. The matching equilibrium in the marriage market features perfect assortative mating: the highest ranking man is matched with the highest ranking woman, the second highest man with the second highest woman, and so on.
Our first critical assumption is the existence of an asymmetry in the relative importance of the two traits across genders. In particular, market traits are more important in determining the desirability of men in the marriage market, while non-market traits are more important for women. This difference can be explained based on biological differences in reproductive roles and on the persistence of gender roles within households (see, for example, Buss, 1989 , 1994 , Eagly et al., 2000 , 2004 . Even today, evidence based on on-line dating and speed-dating shows that men and women value different attributes in prospective partners (see, for example, Fisman et al., 2006) . 16 To further simplify matters, we assume that each trait can take only one of two levels:
x ∈ {x, x} and y = y, y . Therefore, the equilibrium in the marriage market takes on a 15 See Appendix B for a formal description of the model. 16 A handful of studies in economics has emphasized the importance of biological gender differentials on gender roles and market outcomes. See for example, Siow (1998) and Cox (2003 To understand the implications of this matching model for intergenerational mobility, we must consider how the two traits are transmitted across generations. We assume that for both traits x and y, a child can either be endowed with the same level of the trait as his/her parent, or he/she can "switch" -i.e., if the parent is endowed with a high level of the trait, the child will be endowed with a low level, and vice versa. Let π g x and π g y be the probabilities that, respectively, traits x and y "switch" for a child of gender g (g = M, F ).
In the most general case, these switching probabilities are allowed to differ both by trait and by gender, reflecting both institutional and biological factors. We capture the fact that traits are relatively persistent across generations by constraining the "switching" probabilities to be weakly smaller than 1/2. Clearly, lower values of the switching probabilities imply that a trait is highly persistent across generations.
The next key assumption is that the transmission of traits x, y is gender-segregated: specifically, we assume that the father passes on his traits to the son, and the mother passes on her traits to the daughter. While this assumption is clearly extreme (in reality it is likely that children inherit traits from both their parents), we view it as a convenient simplification, which captures the fact that children will be more inclined to view the parent of their same sex as a role model to imitate. There is a literature in sociology about the way in which traits are transmitted from mothers and fathers to daughters and sons. Much of this literature simply argues that mothers influence the occupational status of their children as much as fathers, which is a direct response to the long-standing convention of measuring socioeconomic status using information on fathers alone (Kalmijn 1994 ). However, a number of papers look at sexspecific transmission of traits. While there does not appear to be consensus on this question, there are multiple models, cited in the current literature on this topic, in which parents are more likely to transmit traits to children of the same gender. 17 Some argue that children emulate their parent of the same gender because such behavior is socially reinforced, or that children emulate the parent with whom they spend the most time, which is typically the parent of the same gender (Acock and Yang 1984; Korupp et al 2002) . Other work suggests that mothers pass traits expressly related to "mothering" onto their daughters, which occurs because daughters are more likely to personally identify with their mother than their father (Boyd 1989 ). Most of these studies offer some empirical support for the assertion that the transmission of certain traits is gendered.
Finally, we also assume that the transmission of the x and y traits are independent of each other and across genders. Putting everything together, we can derive a two-generation transition probability matrix where the (j, k) element is the probability of generation t + 1 being in rank k conditional on generation t being in rank j. The two-generation transition matrices for men and women, Π M and Π F are defined as follows.
Note that because of the nature of the matching equilibrium, the transition matrices are not identical for men and women. For example, a man born to the highest rank will move to the second highest rank only if the x trait switches and the y trait does not switch, an event that occurs with probability π M y 1 − π M x . On the other hand, a woman in the highest rank will move to the second highest rank only if trait x stays the same but trait y switches, an event that occurs with probability (1 − π F x )π F y . Based on these transition matrices we can obtain four three generation transition probability matrices, whose (j, k) element is equal to the probability that a grandchild belongs to rank k, conditional on the grandfather belonging to rank j. There are four such matrices depending on the gender of the grandchild and the gender of the middle generation. These three generation matrices, which we denote with Ω g,G , for g = {M, F } and G = {M AT, P AT }, are obtained from the product of the two-generation matrices:
Based on these matrices, we can calculate the three-generation rank correlations, ρ g,G :
where r = 1 2 3 4 and R is the random variable denoting an individual's rank, and has a discrete uniform distribution between 1 and 4.
Explicit formulas for these intergenerational matrices and correlations are presented in the appendix. Here we discuss the differences, (ρ M,P AT − ρ M,M AT ) and (ρ F,M AT − ρ F,P AT ), that are relevant for the interpretation of our findings. Specifically, we are interested in finding conditions such that both differences are positive, i.e., paternal grandfathers matter more for grandsons, but maternal grandfathers matter more for granddaughters. To gain some intuition we analyze the special case in which π M y = π F y ≡ π y and π M x = π F x ≡ π x (the results for the general case are discussed in the appendix). In this case, the conditions are: π x > 3 8 and π y < − 3 2 + 4π x . These conditions tell us that the switching probability for the x trait (non-market skills) must be sufficiently high, while the switching probability for the y trait (market skills) must be relatively low. This asymmetry in the degree of inheritability of market and non-market traits can be justified on the basis of potential differences in the importance of parental investment. For example, market traits (e.g., education) may be more persistent across generations because they are more amenable to parental investments than non-market traits (e.g., physical appearance or reproductive ability). 18 The degree of persistence in the transmission of the market trait may depend on the parents' willingness and ability to invest in the children's human capital, and on the institutional set-up (for example, credit constraints, public spending in education, etc).
As we show in appendix B, the gender differences in G1-G3 transmission that we find can also be generated by gender differences in the degree of inheritability of the market and non-market traits. Specifically, we predict that maternal grandfathers matter more for granddaughters and paternal grandfathers matter more for grandsons if π M y < π F x and π F y < π M x . 19 In other words, if the market trait is transmitted more strongly to men than the non-market trait is transmitted to women, and if the market trait is transmitted more strongly to women than the non-market trait is transmitted to men. This makes sense if the relative inheritability of the market vs non-market trait depends on the distribution of parental investment between these two traits. For example, suppose that fathers invest only in their sons' y trait and not at all in their sons' x trait, so that π M y = 0 and π M x = 1/2. And, suppose that mothers invest the same amount of energy in their daughters, but they divide this investment equally between their daughters' y and x traits, so that π F y = 1/4 and π F x = 1/4. This would generate our observed patterns, and is justifiable if there is some return to investing in a daughter's market trait but no return to investing in a son's non-market trait. This is likely the case if unmarried daughters contribute to a family's total income, either by working on the family farm or working outside the home.
In order to gain insights on why these conditions can explain the observed gender differ- 18 If the extent to which parents can invest in their children's non-market traits is more limited, the degree of persistence in the transmission of the non-market trait will also be more limited. Mailath and Postlewaite, 2006 , argue that these 'unproductive' traits can be thought of as 'social assets' in equilibrium. 19 We also require an additional constraint that bounds the ratio of (π F x − π M y ) to (π M x − π F y ) , which is specified in the appendix. ences in the data let's work through an example. Consider what these values imply for the descendants of a generation 1 grandfather who has high levels of both the x and y traits, and therefore belongs to the highest rank. The low value of π y implies that G2 sons are likely to maintain the high value of the market trait, and therefore are likely to remain in one of the top two ranks. Since the traits are passed along the male line, the G3 male is also likely to stay in one of the top two ranks. Hence, the correlation between grandson and paternal grandfather is likely to be high. Compare this to the outcome of the maternal grandson (the son of a G2 female). The G2 daughter inherits her traits from her mother, who, because of perfect assortative mating, is also endowed with high levels of both x and y. The relatively high value of π x implies that the G2 daughter has a relatively high probability of ending up in the third rank, characterized by low levels of non-market skills (x) and high levels of market skills (y), and will therefore marry an x, y husband. But then, the male grandson will likely inherit the low levels of the y trait from his father, and remain in one of the two lowest ranks.
Within two generations, the maternal grandson will have experienced considerable downward mobility in economic status.
Let us now turn to the outcomes of the granddaughters. Along the female line, the G3 granddaughter will inherit the traits of her mother, who, as described above, is likely to be in either the first or the third rank, and therefore endowed with a high level of y. Because of the high value of π x and the low value of π y , the G3 daughter is also likely to remain in either the first or the third rank. Take instead the paternal granddaughter: the G2 son is likely to maintain the high level of y and therefore remain in either the first or second rank. If the latter, the son will be matched to an x, y wife. This implies that the G3 granddaughter, inheriting the traits of her mother, is also likely to have a low level of y, and therefore will likely be in either the second or fourth rank. The end result is that the paternal granddaughter is more likely to be more removed from her (x, y) grandfather than the maternal granddaughter.
Similar arguments apply to grandfathers who start out in one of the other categories. In short, with a relatively parsimonious set of assumptions, our simple model is able to deliver a rich set of predictions that matches the pattern of intergenerational correlations that is observed in the data.
Case Study: Regional Differences
To provide further insight into the gender differences we find in the G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity, we estimate the effect of paternal and maternal G1's occupational rank on G3's occupational income, separating the sample by region of residence. These results are presented in Table 8 . In panel A, we present results using all three pseudo panels constructed at 20 year intervals; in panel B, we present results using pseudo panels constructed at 30 year intervals.
Clearly, splitting the sample by region has a dramatic effects on our results.
Most of the gender differences are insignificant in columns (3) and (4), in which we restrict the sample to those living in the Midwest; as such, it is difficult to make strong claims about this region. However, we gain some interesting insight by comparing results from the Northeast (columns 1 and 2) with results from the South (columns 5 and 6). In the Northeast, the general pattern seems to be that paternal grandfathers have a greater effect on their grandchildren of both genders than maternal grandfathers. It is also broadly the case that grandsons are more strongly affected by their grandfathers on both sides than granddaughters.
In contrast, the South more closely resembles the gender pattern we observed in the country as a whole. However, the only statistically significant findings for the South are that maternal grandfathers matter more for granddaughters than grandsons, and that maternal grandfathers have a greater impact on their granddaughters than paternal grandfathers. So, we can either conclude that intergenerational transmission of earnings occurs along gendered lines in the South, or that the chain of transmission is stronger along the maternal line.
We can think about these differences in the context of our multi-trait matching model. For simplicity, we will again consider the case in which π M y = π F y ≡ π y and π M x = π M x ≡ π x . In figure 1, we plot combinations of π y and π x that are consistent with transmission being strongest along the paternal line, transmission being strongest along the maternal line, and there being a gender-specific pattern of transmission strength. Our results are consistent with π y and π x lying in region (2) in the Northeast, and in region (3) or (4) in the South. This could be generated by two regional differences in the process by which traits are passed across generations. First, fixing π x , it could be that π SOU T H y > π N ORT H y . In words, this means that the probability of having a y trait that is different from your parent is higher in the South. Alternatively, fixing π y , it could be that π SOU T H x < π N ORT H x . This means that the probability of having an x trait that is different from your parent is lower in the South. These are both plausible conjectures, given what we know about these regions during the period under investigation.
One reason for market traits to be "stickier" in the Northeast than the South is that the South experienced more industrial upheaval during the early 20th century -the time frame from which all of our G3 samples are drawn -than the Northeast did. In particular, the South experienced a large decline in the prevalence of agriculture between 1900 and 1940. In 1900, approximately 60% of the southern workforce was engaged in agriculture; by 1940, this figure was less than 30%. In contrast, the fraction of the northeastern workforce engaged in agriculture fell from 15% to 5% between 1900 and 1940, a much smaller absolute decline. 20 The South was converging with the rest of the country in terms of industrial composition during this period, which might mean that there was more mobility -in terms of market traits -in the South than the Northeast. This is especially likely if occupational or industrial knowledge is one of the market traits that fathers pass on to their sons.
The other potential explanation for the differences between the Northeast and the South is that non-market traits -such as kindness, attractiveness, and reproductive or parenting ability -are "stickier" in the South than the Northeast. Historians characterize the South as highly conservative with respect to gender roles. Scott (1970, p. 4) describes the 'ideal' antebellum southern woman as "a submissive wife whose reason for being was to love, honor, obey, and occasionally amuse her husband, to bring up his children and to manage his household." This persisted through the 19th and 20th centuries: southern states were slow to adopt legislation expanding women's property rights during the 19th century (Kahn 1996), and were largely resistant to women's suffrage in the early 20th century (Green 1997). Looking more recently, researchers have found that while southerners' attitudes toward gender roles had started to converge with the rest of country by the late 20th century, there was still a significant gap (Rice and Coate 1995; Hurlbert 1988). What does this imply about the persistence of non-market traits in the South compared with the Northeast? If women spent more time "mothering" in the South, and if "mothering ability" is an important non-market trait, then it could be passed along more persistently in that region.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have estimated intergenerational elasticities across three generations for the US spanning the late 19 th and early 20 th Century. We find that the intergenerational income process exhibits a strong second-order autoregressive coefficient. We also find that the grandfather-grandchild intergenerational elasticity is larger when the middle generation is male, and we rationalize these findings using a simple three-generation dynastic model where there is a tension between G1's and G2's preferences over G2's consumption, and the timing of transfers is gender specific. These results can have important implications for our understanding of the persistence of socioeconomic status over the long run. (1) (1) -1880-1900 1880-1900-1920 Note: Contains results from OLS regressions of individual G3 log occupational score on the percentile rank of imputed G2 and G1 log occupational score, imputed as the average G2 or G1 log occupational score for each (1) -1880-1910 1870-1900-1930 1880-1910-1940 Panel A: G3 Male Note: Contains results from OLS regressions of individual G3 log occupational score on the percentile rank of imputed G2 and G1 log occupational score, imputed as the average G2 or G1 log occupational score for each (1) Intergenerational income elasticity: G1-G3 Note: The dependent variable in each of these regressions is our estimated G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity under different specifications. All G1-G3 elasticities are taken from OLS regressions of G3 log occupational score on the percentile rank of imputed scores of G2 and G1 (see tables 3 and 4 for additional details). These elasticities are estimated for combinations of 2 G2 genders , 2 G3 genders, 3 sample periods, and 2 intervals at which samples are constructed (20 or 30 years), 2 sample restrictions on G2 (baseline, or both spouses in the same age bracket), and 3 sample restrictions on G3 (baseline, married, or married and both spouses in the same age bracket). Column (1) contains elasticities from all specifications (2 × 2 × 3 × 2 × 2 × 3 = 144 total); the remaining columns contain elasticities for a single G2 or G3 gender. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Tables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)(6)(2) (3) (4) (5)(6)(2) (3) (4) (5)(6)
1860
(2) (3) (4) (5)(6)
1850
(1) 
20-year intervals
30-year intervals 0.002 0.004
Note: Contains results from OLS regressions of individual G3 log occupational score on the percentile rank of imputed scores of G2, paternal G1 and maternal G1; these are imputed as the average for each G3 individual's first name. For women, log occupational score is measured as the log occupational score of her husband.
Columns (1) and (2) (1) Note: Contains results from OLS regressions of individual G3 log occupational score on the percentile rank of imputed scores of G2, paternal G1 and maternal G1; these are imputed as the average for each G3 individual's first name. For women, log occupational score is measured as the log occupational score of her husband.
Columns (1) and (2) (1) (2) and (3) restrict the sample to individuals residing in the Midwest; columns (5) and (6) Note: The figure represents combinations of πx and πy (from the matching model described in section 4.2) that predict different relationships between the importance of paternal and maternal grandfathers in determining their grandchildren's outcomes. Here, we assume that π M x = π F x ≡ πx, and π M y = π F y = πy. In zones 1 & 4, the model predicts a gender asymmetry in importance of paternal or maternal grandfathers, with paternal grandfathers mattering more for grandsons and maternal grandfathers mattering more for granddaughters. In zone 2, paternal grandfathers matter more for all grandchildren; in zone 3, maternal grandfathers matter more for all grandchildren.
A Intergenerational Time Inconsistency: Formal Model
Here, we describe a formal model for the idea discussed in Section 4.1. We consider a threegeneration dynasty. Each generation derives utility from its own consumption and from that of the following generations. Therefore:
We assume throughout that β < 1, reflecting the fact that each generation puts more weight on its own utility relative to future generations' utility; and δ < 1, reflecting the fact that the weight placed on more distant generations' utility also declines. Notice that for G1, the discount factor between its own utility and that of G2 is βδ, while the discount factor between G2 and G3's utility is only δ. This captures the fact that the discount rate between the present and any period in the future is higher than the discount rate between any two periods in the distant future.
Each generation can allocate its income Y t between its own consumption c t and investment in the following generation's human capital, I t+1 . Generation t + 1's income is a function of generation t's investment:
To solve for the optimal allocation of resources across generations, we consider two alternative possibilities. In the first case, G1 decides on how to allocate resources for all three generations, and this decision is binding. In the second case, G2 can reoptimize and decide on the allocation of resources from that point onwards. G1's decision takes into account G2's decision, and decides how much to consume and how much to invest in the next generation as a best response to G2's actions. In the language of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting literature, the first case corresponds to that of an agent who can perfectly commit to the full sequence of decisions made in period 1 (call this the commitment regime), while the second case corresponds to that of a sophisticated agent (the no commitment regime).
We label the optimal consumption choices made by the agent in the commitment and no- Rβδ (1 + δ)
(b) If G1 cannot commit to all future decisions, the incomes of G2 and G3 will be, resepctively
Proof. When G1 can commit to all future resource allocations, he solves the following maximization problem:
This generates the following optimal choices of c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 :
Part (a) follows from the fact that Y 3 = c 3 and Y 2 = c 2 + Y 3 R . When G1 cannot commit to future resource allocations, he will anticipate G2's resource allocation decision and make his decisions accordingly. Taking Y 2 as given, G2 will solve the following: max c 2 ,c 3 ln(c 2 ) + βδ ln(c 3 ) s.t. Y 2 = c 2 + c 3 R
The solution to this problem yields the following optimal choices of c 2 and c 3 :
Then, G1's optimization problem can be written:
The solution to this problem for Y 2 is
The value of Y 3 follows from the solution for c 3 given above, and from the fact that Y 3 = c 3 .
This result allows one to calculate the relationship between the incomes of the different generations. Let η 2,1 and η 3,1 be, respectively, the slope coefficients in regressions of Y 2 and Y 3 on Y 1 . It follows directly from the proposition that η SOP H .
So, the income of the second generation is the same under both regimes, while the income of the third generation is lower in the sophistication regime than in the commitment regime. The intuition for the second result is straightforward. If G1 can commit to a given consumption path for all three generations, it will allocate resources between G2 and G3 in a relatively egalitarian way: from its perspective, G3's utility is discounted only by a factor δ relative to G2's utility. On the other hand, if G2 can reoptimize given its allocation, it will put more weight on its own consumption, as the discount factor that it applies between its own utility and G3's utility is βδ. 21
B Multi-trait Matching and Inheritance: Details
To formalize matters, we assume that the economy is populated by an equal number of men and women, each characterized by two traits, x (the non-market trait) and y (the market trait). We also assume that every couple has exactly one son and one daughter, so that in each generation there will be an equilibrium in the marriage market where each individual is matched to one of the opposite sex.
In the marriage market, every individual is characterized by a unique index of attractiveness, which depends on the individual's x and y traits: h G i (x i , y i ) = x i + φ G y i , G = F, M . The attractiveness function h G (·) differs by gender. Specifically, the non-market trait x has higher weight in determining women's desirability, φ F < 1, while the market trait y is more important for men, φ M > 1. We assume that each trait can take only one of two levels:
x ∈ {x, x} and y = y, y . This assumption delivers the marriage market equilibrium described in the text.
Let π g x and π g y be the probabilities that, respectively, traits x and y "switch" for a child of gender g (g = M, F ). Based on our assumptions and marriage market equilibrium, we obtain the following two-generation transition probability matrices.
The three generation transition matrices are obtained from the product of the two-generation matrices, Π M and Π F . Specifically: 
Note that because all the switching probabilities are bounded between 0 and 1/2, the correlations ρ M,P AT and ρ F,M AT are necessarily greater than zero. On the other hand, ρ M,M AT and ρ F,P AT can be either positive or negative, depending on the exact values of the π s.
We are interested in finding conditions such (ρ M,P AT − ρ M,M AT ) > 0 and (ρ F,M AT − ρ F,P AT ) > 0, i.e., paternal grandfathers matter more for grandsons, but maternal grandfathers matter more for granddaughters. Sufficient conditions for both inequalities to hold are the following:
.
The first inequality states that the switching probability of the dominant trait for men (π M y ) must be smaller than the switching probability of the dominant trait for women (π F x ). This amounts to saying that the transmission of market skills for men is more persistent than the transmission of non-market skills for women. The second inequality states that the transmission of the less important trait is more persistent for women than for men. The third inequality bounds the ratio of π F x − π M y to π M x − π F y , so that the empirical patterns in the data are respected. 
VARIABLES
